The Brattleboro Reformer
January 18, 2005
Carolyn Lorié
BRATTLEBORO -- The New England Coalition claims that the recent inspection done at Vermont Yankee wasn't enough and the group is hoping the Vermont Public Service Board agrees.
Last week, the Brattleboro-based anti-nuclear group filed a motion with the board calling on it to take three actions:
-- Reject the inspection of the plant done by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
-- Require the plant's owner, Entergy Nuclear, to pay for another inspection;
-- Encourage the Legislature and governor to advocate for an independent safety assessment on behalf of Vermont residents.
The inspection was done in August as part of an NRC pilot program to improve reactor oversight. While the inspectors found eight violations, they were said to be of low safety concern. Overall, the plant was found to be in accordance with NRC regulations and the components examined were said to be able to operate at 120 percent capacity.
But the inspection must also meet criteria set by the Public Service Board when it granted Entergy conditional approval of its request to increase power production by 20 percent.
The board did not have the authority to demand an inspection regarding the safety of the plant -- radiological safety can only be regulated by the NRC -- but it could, and did, require assurance that the power boost would not affect reliability.
Under Vermont law, any electricity-producing facility must get board approval before making structural changes, which Vermont Yankee required to increase power production.
The company applied to the board in February 2003. On March 15, 2004, the board approved the changes, only if the plant passed an NRC inspection showing that it would still run reliably after the power increase.
In the board's March 2004 order was a letter to Nils Diaz, commissioner of the NRC, outlining the criteria for the proposed inspection.
The letter requested, among other things, that the "assessment would be a vertical slice review of two safety systems" and two non-safety systems.
According to Arnie Gundersen, a nuclear engineer and an expert witness for the New England Coalition, a vertical slice is a comprehensive look at one system.
For example, if an inspection team were to look at the residual heat removal system for the reactor, it would examine how the system was designed, built, modified and maintained from the time the plant was built in 1972 until the present.
Such an inspection, said Gundersen, would make it easier for inspectors to determine the overall functioning of the plant and detect any systemic problems.
In the motion filed by the coalition, which was written by technical advisor Raymond Shadis, the group argued that the NRC inspection did not include any vertical slices. The NRC, wrote Shadis, instead "selected for inspection 45 individual components (not systems which are comprised of multiple components) from a wide range of systems."
In other words, a lot of systems were looked at but none of them very deeply, therefore the inspection failed to meet the board's criteria.
Attorneys for Entergy filed comments with the board stating the exact opposite.
In terms of the vertical slice requirement, Entergy's counsel did not use the exact term but did state that the inspection team accomplished the following: "examined the adequacy of selected components and operator actions over multiple systems ... and reviewed design calculations, maintenance and modification histories and associated operating procedures."
Entergy officials declined further comment.
The board must now respond to the coalition's motion and decide whether the inspection satisfies its order. The board maintained jurisdiction over the case, until all the criteria of its March 15 decision are met.
The rigorous and thorough inspection performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission met the high standards of the federal government and is on par with the inspections that are done at other nuclear power plants in the United States. The in-depth look into the plant’s operating systems reviewed safety, security, and the plant’s ability to operate at an increased power capacity.
The inspection began August 9th and concluded on September 3rd, 2004. It was prompted by the Vermont Public Service Board’s request while giving consideration to the Vermont Yankee power uprate. The inspectors found “The team concluded that the components and systems reviewed would be capable of performing their intended safety functions. The team also concluded that sufficient design controls had been implemented for design and engineering work, including that related to Entergy’s extended power uprate.” These findings were presented to the public in a December 16th meeting in Brattleboro Vermont.
